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JUDICIAL REINTERPRETATION OF STATUTES:
THE EXAMPLE OF BASEBALL AND
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I. IMMODUcflON
Because of the increasing codification of the law, the interpretation
of statutes has become the major task of our courts. As might be expected,
the literature concerning statutory construction is voluminous., However,
the majority of the commentary does not address itself to the peculiar prob-
lems courts face when they are called upon to review prior interpretations
of statutes. This article will attempt to disclose the questions brought about
in this circumstance, the solutions courts have hit upon and, by use of
example, the practical ramifications of the solutions.
Traditionally, courts have either steadfastly refused to overrule prior
statutory interpretations, thereby paying strict credence to the doctrine of
stare decisis, or have indicated a willingness to review and reexamine prior
constructions, at least to some degree. Thus, an essential question posed
by this inquiry is whether there are adequate reasons for applying stare
decisis more rigidly to precedents of statutory interpretation than to com-
mon law precedents.
The prevailing view is that stare decisis should be adhered to more
strictly when statutory interpretation is implicated. The main thrust of this
reasoning is that a usurpation of the legislative function occurs when courts
reverse an earlier decision concerning statutory construction. The belief
is that courts are legislating because by not following precedent they
actually change the meaning of the statute previously construed. This is
said to impinge upon the legislative function. If the legislature disagrees
with the initial interpretation, the argument runs, then it has the sole
mandate to change the law by amending the statute.
Assuming. that one views the legislative and judicial functions of this
circumstance this simplistically, the supposed legislative review of judicial
interpretations of statutes is fraught with difficulty. For example, the rea-
soning presupposes that legislatures are responsive to judicial edicts. In
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1. See, e.g., C. SAN Ds, STATumES A D STATUTOIIY Coxs-mucio. (4th ed. 1973)
(six volumes). See also P. LANGAN, MAxw=L ON T I,-rmpnPErATm.o OF STATUTES
(12th ed. 1969).
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many instances this may not be an accurate presupposition. Legislatures
are usually extremely busy while in session. The issue presented by a court
reversal of a prior statutory construction may be considered trivial or of
little importance compared to the other questions confronting a legislature.
Further, the nature of legislative bodies may restrict responsiveness to judi-
cial mandates. This is part and parcel of a recognized inertia problem in
legislative bodies.2 As Dean Pound observed, legislatures are primarily
designed and organized for action on appropriations and for political legis-
lation, not for the evaluation of legal matters arising from the promulgation
of statutes.3
Given these rather general observations about the nature of the prob-
lem, a close analysis of a particular sequence of decisions involving an
initial interpretation of a statute and subsequent judicial confrontations with
that interpretation over a period of years will particularize various aspects
of the difficulty facing the courts and perhaps suggest some solutions, The
so-called antitrust exemption enjoyed by organized baseball4 affords an
excellent departure point from which to scrutinize and speculate about the
tasks faced by the judiciary when reevaluating statutory interpretations
and to illustrate pointedly the logical binds in which courts can find them-
selves.
II. EARL.Y HxsroRy OF ORGANiZED BAsrBAiL
In 1922, the Supreme Court held that organized baseball was not
subject to antitrust violations under the Sherman Act.5 In order to under-
stand the significance to professional baseball of this decision and the later
litigation that sought to reverse this interpretation of the Sherman Act, a
brief recapitulation of the origins and early travails of the sport is necessary.
The playing of baseball for money began in 1864 with the formation
of the first professional baseball club, the Cincinnati Red Stockings.0 The
first professional league was formed in 1871 and existed until 1875. Sixteen
of the original twenty-five clubs were economic failures. In 1876, eight of
the nine survivors formed the National League, but the financial plight of
the fledgling sport failed to improve. By the end of the 1879 season, only
2. See H. HART & A. SACKS, MATMALS FOR A Gmmu L Vxv OF Tim AMUCAN
LEGAL SYsTEm 1154-57 (tentative ed. 1956) (interesting discussion of the implications
of the failure of Congress to legislate).
3. Pound, Anachronisms in the Law, 3 J. AM. Jun. Soc'Y 142 (1919).
4. The term "antitrust exemption" is a misnomer for the status organized base
ball has with regard to the antitrust laws. Congress has not given baseball a statutory
exemption; the nonapplicability of the Sherman Act to baseball is the result of judicial
construction of the statute. Thus, the Sherman Act has been construed as not covering
organized baseball; no exception to the statute for baseball has been created.
5. Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922), affg 269
F. 681 (D.C. Cir. 1920) (construing 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970)).
6. SUBCOMiMs. ON THE STUDY OF MONOPOLY POWER OF THE HousE Comm. ON
THE JuDxcLmy, ORGANZED BASEBALL, H.R. REP. No. 2002, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18
(1952) [hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT].
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seven of a total of fifteen clubs admitted during the first four years of the
league had survived.7
The major cause of this difficult beginning was the lack of any re-
straint on the movement of players. They were free to sign with the
highest bidder, and jumping from club to club was common. Then, as
now, a franchise's success depended in large measure on the performance
of the team on the playing field. As a result, the wealthiest clubs attracted
the star performers, and competition on the field became very uneven, fur-
ther hindering the start of professional baseball. For example, the 1869
Cincinnati Red Stockings were undefeated in fifty-seven games. In 1875
the Boston Red Stockings were first-place finishers with a record seventy-
one victories and eight losses. The Brooklyn Atlantics finished last with
only two victories in forty-four games.8
The unrestricted competition for players resulted in player salaries
accounting for two-thirds of the average clubs budget. Finally, the seven
survivors of the National League, in an attempt to remain in business,
agreed not to compete for the services of any player frozen by a club prior
to the 1880 season. Each club was initially allowed to freeze five players.
The new rule resulted in lower payrolls and improved competition on the
field.9
The reserve rule agreement became public in 1883 after the National
League entered into a "National Agreement" with the old American Asso-
ciation, its strongest rival. This agreement, which marked the formal begin-
ning of organized baseball, permitted each team to reserve up to eleven
players and authorized fines for any team tampering with reserve lists.10
Then a few years later a most significant and far-reaching addendum was
incorporated into the agreement. The clubs agreed that player contracts
and the attendant "reserved rights" were assignable within organized base-
ball. This addition essentially gave a team the power to buy, sell, and trade
the services of ballplayers without their consent and was the precursor of
the reserve clause binding players to one team ad infinitum.11
The tightening of the reserve system was caused to a great extent by
competition or player wars between organized baseball and upstart leagues
not subject to the National Agreement.1 Prior to the turn of the century,
7. Id. at 18-22.
8. id.
9. Id. at 22, 111.
10. Id. at 26-27.
11. Id. at 29-31.
12. Since its inception, organized baseball has been involved in at least 13 com-
mercial wars with outlaw leagues. The last challenge to organized baseball's market
monopoly was the two-year war with the Federal League in 1914-15. The two major
leagues of organized baseball bought out the Federal League to end the war. However,
the failure of the Baltimore franchise of the Federal League to acquiesce in the buy-out
resulted in the continuation of the antitrust suit the Federal League had filed against
organized baseball. The ultimate end was the Supreme Court's refusal to apply the
Sherman Act to organized baseball in Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259
U.S. 200 (1922). It should be noted that since the Federal League's market monopoly
1977]
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when organized baseball was struggling to establish itself, outlaw leagues
frequently attempted to raid the rosters of clubs in organized baseball by
offering higher salaries. The first war, between the National League and
the original American Association in 1882, resulted in the National Agree-
ment creating the interleague combination now called organized baseball.' 3
The competing outlaw leagues attacked organized baseball on two
fronts: in competitive bidding for players already under contract to another
club, and in rivalry over consumer markets.1 4 The attraction of top players
was vital to the success of any fledgling league. The free-market bidding
resulted in increased salaries's and induced contract jumping by players
on clubs in organized baseball.
Organized baseball sought to combat the raiding of the outlaw leagues
by resort to the courts. By 1887, every player contract in organized baseball
contained a reserve clause by which a player recognized the team's right
to retain his services for the succeeding year. The club owners sought to
have the courts declare the reserve clause a valid option to renew, which
would effectively prohibit players from playing with clubs outside the
organized baseball penumbra. The courts were not receptive to this ap-
proach initially and refused to enjoin ballplayers from changing leagues,
holding the reserve clause unenforceable because of lack of mutuality, indef-
initeness, and unconscionabiity. 6 Facile attempts to restrict the reserve
clause to meet judicial objections were generally unsuccessful.' 7 When the
American League declared itself a major league in 1901 and began raiding
National League rosters for players subject to the reserve system, thereby
becoming an outlaw league, litigation failed to stop the open bidding for
the talents of many players, including the legendary Napoleon Lajoie. 18
Apart from the attempted enforcement of the reserve clause, organized
baseball frequently tried to enforce player contracts with the aim of pro-
hibiting athletes from breaching contracts and jumping from one club to
another during the operative term of the contract. The results were almost
challenge, three foreign leagues have challenged the player monopoly by signing players
in contravention of organized baseball's reserve clause: the Mexican League (1940)
the Cuban Winter League (1946-47), and the Quebec Provincial League (1947-48).
Comment, Monopsony in Manpower: Organized Baseball Meets the Antitrust Laws, 62
YALE L.J. 576, 604 & n.148 (1953).
13. HousE REPORT, supra note 6, at 26-29.
14. Attempts to attract players were involved in every baseball war and compe-
tition with consumer mirkets was also included in seven other wars. Id.
15. For example, Ty Cobb's salary increased from $12,000 to $20 000 during
the Federal League War and Walter Johnson's salary nearly tripled, going from $7,000
to $20,000. HousE REPORT, supra note 6, at 52-53.
16. See, e.g., Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ward, 9 N.Y.S. 779, 781-85 (Sup.
Ct. 1890); Philadelphia Ball Club, Ltd. v. Hallman, 8 Pa. County Ct. 57 (C.P. 1890).
17. See Griffin v. Brooklyn Ball Club, 68 App. Div. 566, 73 N.Y.S. 864, 872
(1902); HousE REPORT, supra note 6, at 36.
18. Philadelphia Baseball Club v. Lajoie, 202 Pa. 210 51 A. 973 (1902), rev'g
10 Pa. Dist. 309 (C.P. 1901). Lajoie jumped to Cleveland in the American League
from the Philadelphia Phillies; his salary went from $2,400 to $5,500. Comment, Monop-
sony in Manpower: Organized Baseball Meets the Antitrust Laws, 62 YALE L.J. 570,
589 n.68 (1953).
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as discouraging for organized baseball as were the attempts to enforce the
reserve clause.' 9 Courts were of the general opinion that player contracts
were lacking in mutuality and not amenable to specific performance.2
As a consequence of failure in the courts, organized baseball resorted
to extralegal methods to enforce contracts and prevent raiding. It is signifi-
cant that organized baseball has not sought judicial enforcement of the
reserve clause since 1902 or of the uniform player's contract since 1915. The
tactics seized upon by organized baseball in the wars against outlaw leagues
were boycotts against outsiders maling offers to players, blacklists of players
jumping leagues, salary wars for players' services, and games in direct
competition with the newcomer's territory and schedule.2
The most effective weapon was the blacklist. Organized baseball sim-
ply threatened to prevent any player who ignored the reserve rule or
jumped his contract from playing for any team in organized baseball for a
period of from three years to life. Outlaw clubs were forced to offer sub-
stantially larger salaries in their raiding activities, reducing financial viabil-
ity from the outset3m And organized baseball clubs did not hesitate to give
ample salary increments to players wavering before offers from rival
leagues.23
The extralegal techniques were demonstrably effective in combating
the outlaw leagues. The wars resulted in either the extinction of the inde-
pendent league or its joinder with organized baseball As noted, the cur-
rent major league alignment of the National League and the American
19. Unsuccessful attempts by organized baseball to enforce the reserve clause
included: Weegham v. Killefer, 215 F. 168 (W.D. Mich. 1914); Brooklyn Baseball
Club v. McGuire, 116 F. 783 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1902); American Base Ball & Athletic
Exhibition Co. v. Harper, 54 Cent L. J. 449 (Mo. Cir. Ct. 1902); American League
Baseball Club v. Chase, 86 Misc. 441, 149 N.Y.S. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1914); Baltimore Base
Ball Co. v. Hayden & Wiltse, 14 Pa. Dist. 529, 31 Pa. County Ct. 500 (C.P. 1905). See
Neville, Baseball and the Antitrust Laws, 16 Fonnx-.i L. REv. 208, 210 n.6 (1947)
(providing citations to similar cases).
20. Refer to cases in note 19 supra. The Chase litigation involved Hal Chase one
of the premier first basemen of his day. Chase was known as a troublemaker and
gambler, and was implicated (as a gambler, not a player) but never indicted in the
1919 Black Sox Scandal. He was eventually banned from the game by Baseball Com-
missioner Landis. See generally E. AsnzoF, Eicar MzN Otrr 14 225 (1963). Chase
would undoubtedly be in the Hall of Fame but for his off-the-held activities. Chase
signed with Buffalo of the Federal League and the Chicago White Sox attempted to
enjoin him from jumping leagues. American League Baseball Club v. Chase, 86 Misc.
441, 149 N.Y.S. 6, 8 (Sup. Ct. 1914). The court refused to grant the injunction because
of the lack of mutuality in the standard player's contract then used. 149 N.Y.S. at
20. The contract provided for a 10-day cancellation by the club at any time while
the player was bound by the reserve clause. Id. at 14.
21. House RPoRr, supra note 6, at 35, 47, 79 (boycotts); id. at 77-81 (black-
lists); id. at 51-52, 55 (price wars); id. at 35 (competing schedules).
22. Id. at 51-52, 55.
23. Refer to note 15 supra.
24. The Union Association (1884), Players League (1890), old American Asso-
ciation (1891), Atlantic Association (1909), and Federal League (1915) were forced
into extinction. HousE RzPoar, supra note 6, at 29, 35, 56-57. The old American Asso-
ciation (1883), new American Association (1902), American League (1903), Tri-State
League (1907), California State League (1909), Cuban Winter League (1947), and




League came about as a result of a settlement between warring factions.
The last challenge to the monopoly of organized baseball was the
war occasioned by the formation of the Federal League in 1914. This con-
frontation is particularly important to baseball's legal history because it
culminated in the Supreme Court holding in Federal Baseball Club v. Na-
tional League25 that organized baseball was not subject to the antitrust
laws. The Federal League was underwritten by some wealthy, aggressive
backers and all-out war ensued after organized baseball refused to declare
it a major league. The Feds conducted an extensive campaign to obtain
the services of established players.26 Increased salaries resulted from a bid-
ding war as organized baseball sought to retain its top stars. Litigation
ensued as clubs sought to restrain players from jumping contracts and play-
ing with Federal League teams.27 And the Federal League and its constitu-
ent clubs brought a restraint-of-trade suit against organized baseball under
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.
The financial pocket of the Federal League was seriously depleted by
these maneuvers2s Finally in December of 1915, the Feds capitulated and
entered into a peace agreement with organized baseball that called for
the dissolution of the outlaw league and its constituent clubs.20 The agree-
ment convincingly reestablished organized baseball's monopoly.
However, the Baltimore franchise of the Federal League refused to
enter into the dissolution agreement and continued to prosecute the anti-
trust suit against the National and American Leagues. Specifically the plain-
tiff alleged that the National Agreement violated the antitrust laws because
players were bound to their teams by the reserve clause, which made it
impossible for the Federal League to compete or obtain the services of
players of major league caliber.30
By the time the suit reached the Supreme Court in 1922, professional
baseball was reeling from the effects of the Black Sox Scandal, which
threatened the integrity of the game. Eight members of the 1919 Chicago
White Sox team had conspired to throw the World Series to the Cincinnati
25. 259 U.S. 200 (1922) aff'g 269 F. 681 (D.C. Cir. 1920).
26. Among the noteworthy ballplayers jumping to the Federal League were Joe
Tinker, Hal Chase, Ed Plank, and Shoeless Joe Jackson. Tinker and Plank are in Base-
ball's Hall of Fame, and Jackson and Chase would be but for their involvement In the
1919 Black Sox Scandal. See M. OxDnmAN, NEmsoN's 20-M CmuAY ENCYcLoPcniA
oF BASEBALL (1963).
27. Refer to notes 15 and 20 supra. Wade Killefer, a catcher for the Philadelphia
Phillies received $3,200 for the 1913 season. In January 1914, he signed a three-year
contract with Chicago of the Federal League for $5,833.33 per season. Twelve days
later he jumped back to the Phillies for $6,500 a year for three years. House Reor
supra note 6, at 55. Chicago subsequently failed to enjoin the breach of his Fedoral
League contract. Weegham v. Killefer, 215 F. 289 (6th Cir.), affg 215 F. 168 (W.D.
Mich. 1914). See HousE REPORT, supra note 6 at 52-53.
28. The backers of the Federal League lost a reported $2,500,000 in their attempt
to achieve major league status independently of organized baseball. House Ronrm,
supra note 6, at 56.
29. Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 269 F. 681, 682 (1920), ali'd,
259 U.S. 200 (1922).
30. 269 F. at 682-83.
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Redlegs in return for cash from gamblers. Although the accused ballplayers
were acquitted in a jury trial that focused the attention of the country on
the national pastime, the Commissioner of Baseball banned all eight from
the game for life.31
The Federal Baseball decision was argued before the Supreme Court
amid organized baseball's climate of instability and internal disorder. Al-
though the sport was flourishing on the playing field, organized baseball
had experienced a tumultuous beginning off the playing field. It is difficult
to ascertain what direct effect this instability had on the Court.'z In any
event, the Court held that baseball was not engaged in interstate commerce
as defined by section 1 of the Sherman Act, with the result that organized
baseball did not come within the parameters of the antitrust laws.3 This
brief and terse decision gave baseball a total antitrust exemption which
has withstood all challenges and persisted to the present.
III. LAmm CHALLENGEs To TaE Federal Baseball DECISION
The antitrust immunity granted organized baseball by Federal Baseball
stood virtually unchallenged for twenty-five years.: The first substantial
judicial criticism of the statutory interpretation of Justice Holmes in Fed-
eral Baseball occurred in the 1949 case of Gardella v. Chandlera when the
Second Circuit ruled that Gardella, an outfielder who was blacklisted for
ignoring the reserve clause and signing with the outlaw Mexican League,
had stated a cause of action for treble damages under the Sherman Act. 3
In a concurring opinion, Judge Frank characterized Federal Baseball as an
"impotent zombi" and expressed the view that the Supreme Court would
certainly construe the Sherman Act as encompassing organized baseball if
presented with the issue de novo. 7 However, Cardella and a similar
cases were settled out of court, leaving Federal Baseball unscathed, at
least temporarily.
31. See E. ASiNOF, Eicurt MEN Our (1963) for a full coverage of the Black Sox
Scandal.
32. One commentator has even suggested that the Supreme Court's favorable rul-
ing in Federal Baseball was influenced by the fact that Chief Justice William H. Taft
was related to Chicago Cubs owner Phillip Wrigley. J. SPOeT, JUDGE LANDIS AND
TWENTY-FrvE YEAs oF BAsEB irL 109 (1947).
33. Federal Baseball Club v. National League 259 U.S. 200, 209 (1922).
34. But cf. Niemiec v. Seattle Rainier Baseball Club, 67 F. Supp. 705, 712 (W.D.
Wash. 1946) (court displayed some dissatisfaction with the Federal Baseball decision,
but held baseball's exemption to be irrelevant to the case at hand).
35. 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1949) reo'g 79 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). For
a brief discussion of this case, see Toplis, Monopoly in Professional Sports, 58 YALE
L.J. 691, 691-95 (1949).
36. 172 F.2d at 408.
37. Id. at 408-09 (concurring opinion).
38. The other case involved two St. Louis Cardinals, Max Lanier and Fred
Martin, who jumped to the Mexican League. Martin v. National League, 174 F.2d




Four years later in Toolson v. New York Yankees 0 the Supreme Court
was squarely faced with determining if the Federal Baseball interpretation
of the Sherman Act's requirement of interstate trade or commerce should be
reevaluated. The Court, applying the rule of stare decisis narrowly,40
affirmed the Federal Baseball decision while carefully avoiding an explicit
reexamination of the commerce requirement of the Sherman Act or any
of "the underlying issues."41 The Court placed emphasis on the industry's
development and reliance on the antitrust exemption in the thirty-year
interim since Federal Baseball. However, most significantly, the Court
assumed that congressional inaction subsequent to Federal Baseball equaled
congressional approval of organized baseball's antitrust exemption. Any
change in the status quo, the Court stated, was a legislative and not a judi-
cial function.42
For the next two decades organized baseball clung steadfastly to its
antitrust exemption. Then, in October of 1969, the St. Louis Cardinals
attempted to trade their all-star centerfielder, Curt Flood, to the Phila-
delphia Phillies. Flood was not consulted and sought to negotiate a con-
tract with teams other than Philadelphia, in contravention of the reserve
clause. When Commissioner of Baseball Bowie Kuhn refused this request,
Flood filed suit in federal court charging that the reserve system consti-
tuted an unreasonable restraint of trade under sections 1 and 2 of the Slier-
man Act. Flood was denied relief in the District Court for the Southern
District of New York and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, and the
Supreme Court again granted certiorari.
43
But the interim since Toolson had produced a different setting. The
Court had methodically refused to extend the statutory interpretation of
Federal Baseball and Toolson to the booking of legitimate theatre produc-
tions throughout the country, 44 professional boxing,45 and professional foot-
ball.46 In each case the Court found that the activity or business was
engaged in interstate trade or commerce and within the purview of section
I of the Sherman Act. Toolson was characterized as a narrow application
of the rule of stare decisis, and the Court emphasized that it was up to
Congress not only to contract the doctrine embodied in that decision but
39. 346 U.S. 356 (1953). The decision encompassed three cases brought by pro-
fessional baseball players seeking treble damages for violations of the antitrust laws.
Corbett v. Chandler, 202 F.2d 428 (6th Cir. 1953); Kowalski v. Chandler, 202 F.2d 413
(6th Cir. 1953); Toolson v. New York Yankees, 101 F. Supp. 93 (S.D. Cal. 1951), aft'd,
200 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1952).
40. Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953). This holding Is
discussed in United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222, 229-30 (1955). In this decision
the Court declined to grant to theatrical enterprises the same exemption accorded
organized baseball. Id. at 230.
41. Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953).
42. Id.
43. Flood v. Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 443 F.2d 264 (2d
Cir. 1971), aff'd, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
44. United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222, 230-31 (1955).
45. United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236, 244 (1955).
46. Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 452 (1957).
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also to expand it to other sports or entertainments.47 In essence, the Court
limited the statutory interpretation of the Sherman Act espoused in Federal
Baseball to organized baseball and refused to extend the construction to
even a like business enterprise such as professional football.
The professional football case, Radooich v. National Football Lcague,4S
struck down that sport's reserve clause and firmly established that the
Court's view of the meaning of the interstate trade or commerce require-
ment of section 1 of the Sherman Act had changed as applied to profes-
sional athletics. The Court stated in Radovich, in an apparent attempt to
justify the inconsistency of the interpretation of the same statute in
different sports, that baseball would come within the ambit of the anti-
trust laws if that question were presented to the Court for the first time.49
Again the conclusion was that the legislature had the sole prerogative to
eliminate the discrimination or inconsistency.50 In later decisions, federal
courts uniformly held that professional hockey and professional basketball
were subject to the antitrust laws.5'
A somewhat different judicial attack on the Federal Baseball and Tool-
son duality occurred in Salerno v. American League of Professional Base-
ball Clubs.52 Although the plaintiffs failed to secure federal jurisdiction for
their claim that their discharge as umpires in the American League consti-
tuted antitrust violations, Judge Friendly expressed his opinion that inter-
state television broadcasts made "baseball's immunity from the antitrust
laws more anomalous than ever."53 The Toolson decision was not an affir-
mation of the Federal Baseball rationale that baseball's activities did not
sufficiently affect interstate commerce to come within the Sherman Act
but rather was based on the ground that Congress had evinced no intention
to bring baseball within the antitrust laws. The Toolson Court deferred to
the legislative function but, nevertheless, interpreted the legislative silence
following Federal Baseball as congressional intent to exclude baseball from
the Sherman Act. Judge Friendly strongly noted his disagreement with
the statutory interpretation of Federal Baseball and termed the Toolson
rationale "extremely dubious."-'
Despite these criticisms and the uniform application of the antitrust
laws to other professional sports, the Supreme Court affirmed the Federal
47. See, e.g., United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222,230 (1955).
48. 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
49. Id. at 452.
50. Id.
51. Haywood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204 (Douglas, Circuit
Justice, 1971) (basketball); Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 32 F. Supp.
1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (basketball); Peto v. Madison Square Garden Corp.. 1958
TRAzE CAS. (CCH) f 69 106 (S.D.N.Y.) (hockey); Washington Professional Basketball
Corp. v. National Basketball Ass'n, 147 F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (basketball).
See Comment, Discipline in Professional Sports: The Nced for Ploajcr Protection, 60
GEo. L.J. 771 (1972).
52. 429 F.2d 1003 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1001 (1971).




Baseball and Toolson decisions and refused to declare organized baseball
subject to the Sherman Act in the 1972 case of Flood v. Kuhn.' The opinion
contained a nostalgic tribute to the game of baseball, which may have
colored the author's neutrality on the subject."0 Still, the reasoning of the
opinion was forthright. Justice Blackmun candidly stated that "[p]rofessional
baseball is a business and it is engaged in interstate commerce." 7 However,
that admission did not necessitate the overruling of Federal Baseball and
Toolson because of the principle of stare decisis. Although the exclusion of
baseball was characterized as an aberration, the Court justified the strict
application of stare decisis because of baseball's unique characteristics and
needs. s8 Thus, rather than reevaluating the Federal Baseball statutory con-
struction of section 1 of the Sherman Act on its merits, the Court, while
admitting the insufficiency of that interpretation, affirmed the Toolson
reasoning that Congress has expressed no intent that organized baseball be
included within the antitrust laws. Since the issue was considered appro-
priate for legislative and not judicial action, the Court believed that it
was constrained to maintain the status quo. 9
IV. ImpLCATIONS oF Federal Baseball AND Flood
The preceding legal history of organized baseball vividly illustrates
the varied considerations courts may meet when reviewing a prior statu-
tory interpretation. It also illustrates the kind of illogical and inconsistent
propositions that a strict adherence to principles of stare decisis can produce.
This is paradoxical because a traditional justification of stare decisis is the
uniformity and consistency it gives the law. However, it may be that the
alternative of reinterpreting the prior statutory construction and overruling
the previous line of cases does not on balance mandate a result sufficient
to cast aside stare decisis. Thus the query is whether the strict application
of stare decisis to prior statutory interpretations is justified when the
result is the affirmance of a decision acknowledged to be an anachronism.
It is indisputable that the maturation of organized baseball since the
Federal Baseball decision in 1922, together with the precedent of the
application of the antitrust laws to other professional sports, indicates that
a court facing an initial interpretation of the Sherman Act as applied to
baseball would have little choice but to hold organized baseball subject
to the antitrust laws. Then the application of stare decisis to the initial
statutory interpretation has, at least in the circumstance of organized base-
55. 407 U.S. 258, 283-85 (1972).
56. Id. at 260-64. One commentator viewed Justice Blackmun's tribute to the
game of baseball as follows: "Judicial impartiality blurs somewhat when the author
wears his heart on his sleeve." 118 CONG. REc. 22283 (1972) (reprinting Dowling,
Quaint Opinion From the Court, Washington Evening Star, June 25, 1972). See also
Note, Antitrust Law, 48 No'ras DAME LAw. 460, 471 n.87 (1972).
57. 407 U.S. at 282.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 283-84.
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ball, produced a different result than if the Flood case were one of first
instance.
All- of this does not, however, mean that Federal Baseball was improp-
erly decided. Organized baseball had experienced a tumultuous beginning
and had great difficulty establishing financial viability. Upstart leagues
had repeatedly challenged the financial stability of organized baseball by
engaging in economic warfare. As a consequence, organized baseball's
control over the top players was constantly undermined. Then, after base-
ball had seemingly survived the strong Federal League challenge, the
Black Sox Scandal was unveiled. The scandal threatened the moral integ-
rity of the game. A reorganization of the administration of organized base-
ball was undertaken and a Commissioner of Baseball was named in an
attempt to police the sport more tightly. In the wake of this, baseball was
increasingly capturing the imagination of the post-World War I American
public, at least on the playing field. With the advent of the "liven ball
and the emergence of Babe Ruth, baseball was more popular than ever
before. In view of organized baseball's past hardships and its seeming
emergence from them, it is understandable that the Supreme Court in
Federal Baseball believed it necessary to maintain the status quo and
insulate the sport from further wars with leagues outside organized base-
ball.60
On the other hand, the same considerations did not apply to organized
basebll in 1972. The sport was firmly established financially, and no out-
side threats had appeared on the horizon in years.01 There was no question,
particularly with the widespread radio and television coverage of the games,
that baseball was engaged in interstate commerce.02 Further, the antitrust
laws were applied to other professional sports with little apparent dele-
terious effect
From all indications it is certain that the Supreme Court would inter-
pret section 1 of the Sherman Act as applying to organized baseball if
confronted with an initial construction of the Act.3 In Flood the Court
refused to reach the merits of the prior interpretation; that is, it neither
reinterpreted the meaning and applicability of the statute nor determined
that the initial construction was correct. Thus, the Supreme Court viewed
its judicial function differently when reviewing prior statutory interpre-
60. Of course, the Supreme Court arguably could have taken the opposite view
and required baseball to meet its competition and compete in the market place subject
to antitrust restraints like other businesses.
61. The Mexican League, in 1946, did offer attractive salaries to several estab-
lished major league ballplayers to jump their teams. However, there was no challenge
to organized baseball's market monopoly. Similarly, the Cuban Winter League (1946-
47) and the Quebec Provincial League (1947-48) also sought to sign players in orga-
nized baseball, although to a lesser scale. HousE RErn'rr, supra note 6, at 77-84.
62. In fact, in 1961, Congress enacted legislation exempting baseball, basketball.
football, and hockey from the antitrust laws with regard to their sale of televising and
broadcasting rights. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291-1295 (1970).
63. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 288 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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tations than when confronted with a statute for the first time.
The Supreme Court in Flood affirmed the Toolson rationale that con-
gressional silence subsequent to the Federal Baseball decision indicated
congressional approval of the initial statutory interpretation. Since the
Court believed that, once it made the initial statutory interpretation, the
legislature had the sole mandate to review and change the interpretation,
the Court was constrained to rigidly apply stare decisis. Congress had not
seen fit to change the law made by Federal Baseball and, since it was the
legislative function to do so, silence could only mean congressional ap-
proval. Thus, the Court-created exemption of organized baseball from the
antitrust laws is subject only to legislative and not judicial review.
V. CONCRESSIONAL SILENCE
As the Flood dissents of Justices Douglas and Marshall disclose, the
Supreme Court has wavered in its view of the limitation congressional
silence places on judicial reinterpretations of statutes."' While Flood possi-
bly represents the Court's greatest expression of deference to congressional
silence, the 1940 decision of Helvering v. Hallock6 is indicative of the
opposite view. There Justice Frankfurter, in an oft-quoted passage, stated:
It would require very persuasive circumstances enveloping Con-
gressional silence to debar this court from re-examining its own
doctrines. To explain the cause of non-action by Congress when
Congress itself sheds no light is to venture into speculative unreali-
ties .... Various considerations of parliamentary tactics and strat-
egy might be suggested as reasons for the inaction . . . of Con-
gress, but they would only be sufficient to indicate that we walk
on quicksand when we try to find in the absence of corrective
legislation a controlling legal principle.
66
Similarly in Girouard v. United States07 the Supreme Court held that "it
is at best treacherous to find in Congressional silence alone the adoption
of a controlling rule of law."68 A middle ground was reached in Jones v.
Liberty Glass Co.69 where the Court stated that legislative silence subse-
quent to a judicial construction of a statute is at best only an auxiliary
tool for use in interpreting an ambiguous statutory provision.
70
64. Id. at 287-88, 292-93.
65. 309 U.S. 106 (1940).
66. Id. at 119-21.
67. 328 U.S. 61 (1946).
68. Id. at 69.
69. 332 U.S. 524 (1947).
70. Id. at 534; see Phelps, Factors Influencing judges in Interpreting Statutes,
3 VAND. L. REv. 456, 468 (1950). But see United States v. South Buffalo By., 333
U.S. 771, 774-83 (1948) (prior construction is binding where Congress has expressly
refused to take legislative action that would overrule the judicial construction In
question). For a view that legislative silence is absolutely binding on courts, see
Horack, Congressional Silence: A Tool of Judicial Supremacy, 25 TEXAs L. Rrv. 247,
252 (1947).
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The vagaries of the Supreme Court opinions on the doctrine of con-
gressional acquiescence in judicial statutory interpretations suggest that
each Justice has his own view of the subject; indeed, some Justices appear
to waver on the subject.7 ' It is quite conceivable that the Court has utilized
congressional silence as a means to achieve the end at which the majority
arrives. While the suggested use of the doctrine as a justification for deci-
sions may be speculative, the failure of the Court to establish any consis-
tency when dealing with prior interpretations leads to this ind of conclu-
sion.72
Of course, judicial deference to congressional silence may often be
argued because of a corollary consideration. If a court believes that the
issue is one for legislative and not judicial resolution, it will refrain from
positing anything that would be a usurpation of the legislative function. In
the case of the review of a prior statutory interpretation, a court talng
this position cannot reinterpret or change the prior construction because
to do so would interfere with the duty of the legislature. Thus, in order to
justify the resulting affirmance of the prior interpretation, the court must
view the intervening legislative inaction as an expression of approval of
the initial interpretation, since any reevaluation is for the legislature. This
kind of circuitous reasoning is precisely what was employed in the Toolson
and Flood decisions to justify the judicial refusal to reevaluate the Court-
made exclusion of organized baseball from the antitrust laws.
Judicial deference to legislative silence based on the belief that the
question presented is one for legislative action does not justify the use of
71. As an example of judicial wavering, compare the vicws of Justice Douglas
in United Gas Improvement Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 381 U.S. 392, 406 (1985)
(prior construction should stand in the event of legislative silence), with Flood v. Kuhn,
407 U.S. 278, 287-88 (1972), and Douglas, Stare Decis, 49 COLM . L. REv. 735, 746-
47 (1949) (prior construction may be reinterpreted regardless of legislative silence).
72. State courts are likewise inconsistent in their treatment of prior statutory
constructions. For example, in Windust v. Department of Labor & Industries. 52 Wash.
2d 33, 323 P.2d 241 (1958), the Washington Supreme Court reversed its prior
interpretation of a workmen's compensation statute that had been uniformly applied
for 25 years. The court rashly declared that stare decisis did not apply to prior judicial
statutory constructions. 323 P.2d at 244. The enigmatic opinion viewed the application
of stare decisis to statutes as giving more weight to udicial decisions than to the
statutes themselves. The result was then eventual repeal or amendment of the statute
because the legislative purpose of the statute would be eroded through continual
judicial paraphrasing of the statute when applying precedent. Id. The court believed
that the judiciary should look only to the language of the statute when a pplying statu-
tory law. Id. at 245. But the Texas Supreme Court has taken an antipodal stance. In
Marmon v. Mustang Aviation, Inc., 430 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. 1968), the court held that
the Texas wrongful death act could not be given extraterritorial effect because it had
been construed for 80 years in accordance with the normal presumption that a statute
is presumed to have no extraterritorial application unless it expressly so provides.
The court stated that stare decisis has its greatest force when statutory interpretation
is involved. Id. at 186. In contrast to the Washington court, the Texas court viewed
subsequent reinterpretations of a statute as diluting the original statutory meaning.
The court pointed out that the legislature could amend if the initial construction v.as
unacceptable. Id. Interestingly, the Texas Legislature did amend the wrongful death
statute subsequent to the Mustang Aviation decision, giving Texas courts the right
to give extraterritorial effect to the Texas wrongful death statute. Tx. REv. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 4678 (Supp. 1977).
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legislative inaction to support a judicial decision. If presented as a justifi-
cation for the courts' use of legislative silence to denote legislative approval
of a prior statutory interpretation, more must be exhibited than the expres-
sion that the question is one for legislative action. Even assuming that the
issue is one particularly within the legislative realm, it does not follow that
legislative silence subsequent to a judicial statutory construction necessarily
mandates legislative approval of the interpretation. This position presup-
poses that legislatures are peculiarly responsive to the actions of the courts.
Dean Levi, in a famous statement of the propriety of judicial deference
to legislative silence, recognized that the inaction of a legislature subsequent
to a judicial statutory interpretation does not imply legislative approval. 0
He viewed the problem as one of correctly allocating responsibility for
effective action.7 4 Legislatures are responsible for the enactment and pro-
liferation of statutes and should have the responsibility for changing their
meanings. Further, Dean Levi believed that legislative bodies are better
equipped to handle, and thus more responsive to, needed statutory changes.
Judicial reversal of statutory construction is justified, according to Levi,
only when the matter is one of constitutional import.75 Judicial deference
to legislative silence was said to mark the essential dichotomy between
case law and the law resulting from statutory interpretation.
Dean Levi recognizes that legislative silence does not connote legis-
lative sanction of a judicial statutory construction, which is another way
of saying that legislatures are not automatically responsive to judicial fiat.
He must therefore believe that it is preferable for some misconstructions of
statutes to go uncorrected than for a court to be permitted to overrule its
own errors. 76 This phenomenon is illustrated by the Toolson and Flood
decisions. The Flood Court in particular seemed in agreement that, at the
least, the statutory construction of Federal Baseball was no longer apposite
given the recognizably interstate character of organized baseball in the
19 7 0s and the judicial decisions applying the Sherman Act to other profes-
sional sports. However, the judicial belief that any reevaluation of the
prior construction was for Congress and the absence of congressional action
either prior or subsequent to Toolson and Flood has singularly perpetuated
the Federal Baseball anomaly.
Further, it can be seen that judicial deference to the legislative func-
tion of reviewing all statutory interpretations can not only have the effect
of permitting misconstructions to go uncorrected but must have the more
startling effect of perpetuating and legitimizing the mistake. As the Toolson
and Flood cases again show, the continued judicial refusal to reexamine
73. Levi, Introduction to Legal Reasoning, 15 U. Ci. L. REv. 501, 540 (1948).
74. Id.
75. Id.; accord, Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerk's Union, 398 U.S. 235, 259
(1970) (Black, J., dissenting).
76. For a critical appraisal of this position, see P. MIsInmuN & C. Momus, ON
LAw IN Cours 483 (1965).
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prior statutory interpretations results in the application of the doctrine
of stare decisis by each succeeding court to the original mistake. The
application of stare decisis, by its own terms, has the effect of legitimizing
and exhibiting judicial approval of the original misconstruction or, at least,
of an outdated interpretation.
Given the foregoing considerations, it is crucial to inquire whether a
strict bifurcation of legislative and judicial responsibility is worth the price
paid. Aside from questions of effectiveness and responsiveness to the review
of statutory interpretations, the fear is prevalent that the judiciary will
completely usurp the legislative role of revising statutory law. Underscoring
this is the belief that in our system of government, change, particularly
controversial change, should be made by legislative bodies.78 Legislators
are at least in theory directly answerable to their constituents for their
actions. And although the responsiveness of legislatures to judicial miscon-
structions is questionable, legislative bodies are purportedly more adept
at the review of statutory law because they have the facility to deliberate
about a wide range of considerations, while courts are limited to the facts
of the case before them. Thus, the argument runs, legislatures are better
equipped to consider and effectuate changes, particularly major changes
with long-lasting effects, vhen statutory reform is necessary.
In response to this line of reasoning, it is important to remember that
legislatures always have the power to overrule a courts construction of a
statute, whether it be after the initial interpretation or a subsequent rein-
terpretation. It may be hypothesized that legislatures are most likely to
react whenever vigorous disagreement with a judicial statutory edict exists.
A statutory interpretation by a court that is disparate from the legislative
purpose is likely to overcome legislative inertia and divert legislative atten-
tion from its traditional tasks.79 Also, the limited focus of a court reviewing
a prior statutory interpretation serves as a check of judicial usurpation of
the legislative province. Since a court is confined to the application of a
particular statute to a particular factual situation, the likelihood that sweep-
ing reforms or controversial reversals will occur are substantially lessened,
especially considering that where a statute has already been the subject
of a judicial pronouncement, the court is further constrained by the princi-
ple of stare decisis. And the legislature can always check the impact of a
controversial interpretation by amendment or repeal.
A judicial unvillingness to reevaluate prior statutory interpretations
impedes rather than assists the development and refinement of the law.
Instead of having two interdependent bodies responsible for improving and
advancing statutory law, only the legislature has responsibility after a court
77. See generally Friendly, The Cap in Lawmaking-Judges Who Can't and Legis-
lators Who Won't, 63 CoLUm. L. R v. 787, 791 (1963).
78. Levi, Introduction to Legal Reasoning, 15 U. Cm. L. RLv. 501, 523 (1948).
79. Refer to note 72 supra for a discussion of the Mustang Avaiation decision
relating to the Texas wrongful death act.
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has once spoken on the subject. The judiciary is put in the anomalous
position of being unable to correct its own errors.
VI. STARE DECISIS
When courts refuse to review the merits of a prior statutory construc-
tion, whether owing to legislative silence, deference to the legislative func-
tion, or both, the doctrine of stare decisis is more rigidly applied than when
courts are faced with common law or court-made precedents. Adherence to
legal precedent is typically predicated on the desire to have certainty and
predictability in the law.80 If achieved, the public is able to place strong
reliance on judicial decisions and conduct its affairs in a lawful manner.
When dealing with the review of statutory interpretations, an additional
reason can be posited for strict allegiance to stare decisis. If one views a
judicial reevaluation of a construction of a statute as a usurpation of the
legislative function, then the application of stare decisis to a prior inter-
pretation is mandatory absent intervening legislative action.
Justices Brandeis and Black have been the leading Supreme Court
proponents of this reasoning. In his dissent in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail
Clerk's Union,81 Justice Black stated:
When this Court is interpreting a statute, however, an additional
factor must be weighed in the balance. It is the deference that this
Court owes to the primary responsibility of the legislature in the
making of laws .... When the law has been settled by an earlier
case then any subsequent "reinterpretation" of the statute is gra-
tuitous and neither more nor less than an amendment: it is no
different in effect from a judicial alteration of language that Con-
gress itself placed in the statute.
8 2  g
Black went even a step further and suggested that since reinterpretation
of a statute by a court is tantamount to a judicial statutory amendment,
such action may constitute a constitutional violation of the legislative
powers of Congress under article I of the Constitution.83 However, Black
did believe, along with Justice Douglas,84 that the limitations of stare decisis
do not prohibit the reconsideration of a statute where constitutional ques-
tions are present.85
80. Lord Eldon said long ago that it was "better the law should be certain, than
that every Judge should speculate upon improvements . . . ." Sheddon v. Coodrich,
32 Eng. Rep. 441, 447 (Ch. 1803). Professor Wasserstrom has stated that the major
justifications for the use of precedent are certainty, reliance, equality, and efficiency.
R. WAssEnsTRoM, Tim JuDic AL DEIcSION 60-73 (1961). See also Catlett The Devel-
opment of the Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Extent to Which It Should Be Applied,
21 WASH. L. REv. 158 (1946).
81. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
82. Id. at 257-58 (Black, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 258.
84. United Gas Improvement Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 381 U.S. 392, 406 (1965)
(Douglas, J., dissenting). Refer to text accompanying note 71 supra.
85. 398 U.S. at 259 (Black, J., dissenting).
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Justice Brandeis, writing in 1932, laid the cards on the table when
he said: "Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters
it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that
it be settled right." 6 The reasoning in the Toolson and Flood decisions is
certainly consistent with this view. It also is indicative of the difficulties
that such a rigid approach promulgates. For if the legislature is not respon-
sive in correcting an imprudent judicial result, the law remains unaltered.
The argument that a consistent, predictable result is assured wanes when
the propriety of the result perpetuated is questionable.
Justice Frankfurter has been the leading proponent of the view that
a court is not arbitrarily limited in reinterpreting a statute. In Helvering v.
HalloCk87 he maintained that:
Our problem then is not that of rejecting a settled statutory con-
struction. The real problem is whether a principle shall prevail
over its later misapplications. Surely we are not bound by reason
or by the considerations that underlie stare decisis to persevere in
distinctions taken in the application of a statute which, on further
examination, appear consonant neither with the purposes of the
statute nor with this Court's own conception of it.8
The Hallock Court candidly reviewed and overruled an earlier statutory
construction, holding that the earlier interpretation did not effectuate the
purpose of the statute.8 9 The Court subsequently has reinterpreted and
reversed prior constructions of statutes on frequent occasions including
more recently the reversal of an earlier interpretation of the Norris-La-
Guardia Act in Boys Markets.9
The retrenchment of the Court in the Flood case illustrates the char-
acter of the fundamental difference between standing by the bare result
of a case and standing by the essential reasoning of it.0Y The strict appli-
cation of stare decisis precludes the possibility of ever reaching the propriety
of the prior interpretation. The decision-making process is reduced to
ruminations about who should decide the issue and speculation about what
the legislative position on the matter is rather than considerations or con-
cern about the appropriateness of the earlier result to the present day and
to the legislative purpose. Further, the mandatory application of stare
decisis to statutory interpretations has the effect of imputing legislative
86. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
87. 309 U.S. 106 (1940).
88. Id. at 122.
89. Id. The case involved the applicability of § 302(c) of the Revenue Act of
1926 to inter vivos transfers of property in trust. The Court, in overruling prior statu-
tory interpretations, held that the value of the remainder interest of the trust fund
should be included in the decedent's gross estate under § 302(c). Id.
90. 398 U.S. at 254-55. But see Johnson v. Mississippi, 421 U.S. 213 (1975),
where the Court refused to overrule prior decisions interpreting the federal removal
statute and held that it was up to Congress to make revisions. Id. at 227-28.
91. See H. HART & A. SACKS, MATERIALS FOR A GENm1A VMV OF Tm AMu-
CAN LEGAL SYSTEM 1128-40 (tentative ed. 1956).
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sanction to a silent legislature. Since legislative approval may or may not
be correctly inferred, judicial respect to the supposed approval should not
be conferred.
Compulsory adherence to precedent in statutes transfers the responsi-
bility for the improvement and correction of the application of statutory
law to the legislature. If the legislature does not for whatever reason meet
the challenge, the law remains static. The status quo is fostered by the
judicial application of stare decisis. But a major justification which is
said to outweigh this consequence is the preservation of uniformity and
predictability in the law. However, Flood signifies a notable irony. For, as
a result of the Supreme Court's earlier refusal to apply the statutory inter-
pretation of Federal Baseball to any other sport or entertainment, the strict
adherence to precedent in Flood insures not uniformity but diversity in
the law. It is hard to understand how the law's stability and predictability
are promoted when professional football and professional basketball are
subject to the antitrust laws but organized baseball is not.
Justice Black's argument, espoused in his Boys Markets dissent, that
the deference courts owe to legislatures as the primary lawmakers increases
the role of stare decisis in statutory review likewise suffers when the
product is the confusion and inconsistency of Flood. The position inappro-
priately assumes that the legislature will in fact fulfill its designated role
as primary lawmaker. When it does not or cannot, no decisionmaker
remains to fill the void. Such an approach overlooks the reality that legis-
latures are principally effective in producing new law, not in reviewing old
law.9 2 Legislatures should be free to confront contemporary issues rather
than oversee judicial blunders. The judiciary is better equipped to correct
its errors than is a legislative body, because a court will normally have
to face the problem squarely, if it faces it at all, while a legislature may
never consider an improprietous statutory construction for a variety of
reasons.
The fear of judicial overreaching and the usurpation of legislative
power is exaggerated by proponents of the compulsory use of precedent.93
Most courts go to great lengths to divine the legislative purpose and intent
of a statute. The judiciary is cognizant of its role as an interpreter and not
a promulgator of statutory law. It is quite unlikely that the Supreme Court
would have been criticized about the lack of judicial restraint if it had
overruled Federal Baseball in Flood, considering the change of circum-
stances surrounding organized baseball and the lack of congressional action
in the intervening fifty years. And of course, the legislature always has the
authority and the prerogative to defeat any judicial construction not in
92. Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking-Judges Who Can't and Legislators Who
Won't, 63 COLuM. L. REv. 787, 791 (1963).
93. See Cohen, Judicial "Legisputation" and the Dimensions of Legislativo Mean-
ing, 36 INm. L.J. 414, 415 (1961).
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keeping with the legislative purpose, whether it be after an initial or sub-
sequent statutory interpretation.
Finally, compulsory stare decisis may weaken the regard for our legal
institutions. The failure of the courts and Congress to right the indefensible
inconsistencies resulting from organized baseball's antitrust status breeds
contempt for the system. 4
VII. NoNjumCiaAL SoLunToxs
When the judiciary and legislatures fail to resolve issues in a contem-
porary manner, satisfaction may be obtained elsewhere. Organized baseball
historically developed with little direction from either the courts or the
legislatures. The early outlaw league wars were resolved extrajudicially
either by compromise or by use of economic measures. Even judicial inter-
pretation of the reserve clause was largely circumvented. 5 When the eight
ballplayers accused of throwing the 1919 World Series were acquitted by
a jury in 1921, the Commissioner nevertheless banned all eight from the
game for life. 6
More recently the baseball players' union forced an extrajudicial com-
promise upon the baseball owners that weakened the reserve system and
resulted in a special draft for players who had not signed contracts with
their respective clubs for the past season 7 This settlement was greatly
precipitated not by court action but by nonjudicial arbitration resulting
from collective bargaining. The arbitrator held that the reserve clause
obligated a player contractually for only one year after the term of the
contract.98 After the option year, a player is thus free to sign with the
highest bidder. The arbitration award gave Andy Messersmith and Dave
McNally, of the Los Angeles Dodgers and Montreal Expos respectively,
94. Szanton, Stare Decisis; A Dissenting View, 10 HAsTrcs L.J. 394, 397 (1959).
The author of this article states:
The jurist concerned with "public confidence in, and acceptance of the judicial
system" might well consider that, however admirable its resolute adherence to
the law as it was, a decision contrary to the public sense of justice as it is,
operates, so far as it is known, to diminish respect for the courts and for law
itself.
Id. See also Douglas, Stare Decisis 49 COLUb.. L. REv. 735, 746-47 (1949); Comment,
Baseball's Antitrust Exemption: The Limits of Stare Decisis, 12 B.C. Lnn. & CoM. L.
REv. 737, 746 (1971).
95. Refer to text accompanying notes 15-21 supra.
96. HousE B.PoRT, supra note 6, at 60; E. AsynoF, ExcaT ME Otrr 273 (1963);
J. SpnzNE JUDGE LANis AND Twumrv-FvE Y wns OF BAsEnM.r (1947).
97. In addition to the special draft, the agreement provided that a player with
five years of major league experience can demand to be traded to another team and
may list six teams to which he does not wish to be traded. Also the agreement provided
that in the future any player may become a free agent by playing out the option or
renewal year in his contract. N.Y. Times, July 25, 1976, § 5, at 8, coL 3; id. July 13,
1976, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
98. Id. Dec. 24, 1975, § 1, at 1, col. 7; id. Dec. 25, 1975, § 1, at 15, coL 6.
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free-agent status. 09 Although McNally retired, Messersmith signed a lucra-
tive long-term contract with the Atlanta Braves.
The agreement to arbitrate prohibited appeal to the courts. The base-
ball owners appealed anyway, but the federal district court held that the
arbitrator's decision was binding.100 A substantial number of players
sought to take advantage of the decision and played out their options
during the 1976 season. Players currently in their option year were declared
free agents at the end of the 1976 season according to the agreement, and
a special draft was held to determine which teams could bid for their ser-
vices. Fourteen established ballplayers were among the more than twenty
players participating in the special draft.' 10
One of the traditional arguments of organized baseball in support of
the reserve clause and the antitrust exemption has been that the reserve
system is essential to maintain a competitive balance within the leagues.
The fear was prevalent that in a free market the top talent would be
attracted to the richest clubs in the glamour cities. But only one of the
free agents, Reggie Jackson, who went from Baltimore to the New York
Yankees, signed with a team that had a better record than the team the
player performed for in 1976.102 The poorer clubs actually benefited at the
expense of teams higher in the standings.
It is admittedly early to draw conclusions about the forced restructur-
ing of the reserve system.103 But the failure of the courts and Congress to
adequately confront the difficulties has led to a nonjudicial and nonlegis-
lative resolution.
VIII. Tn NATuRE oF Tm STATuTE
One facet of statutory interpretation often overlooked by judges and
commentators is the influence that the nature of the statute should play
in delineating the judicial interpretive role. Statutes may be drawn to
cover specific, discernible objectives or may be designed to provide gen-
99. Refer to note 98 supra.
100. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n,
409 F. Supp. 233 (W.D. Mo. 1976); N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1976, § 1, at 19, col. 2.
101. N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1976 § 5, at 1, col. 3.
102. Id. Nov. 28, 1976, § 5, at 3, col. 2.
103. Of course, there is no doubt that the compromise has had a drastic effect
on player salaries. The average major league salary in 1969 was less than $25,000.
In 1976 it was about $50,000 and the average will probably be close to $100 000 in
1977. Significantly, not only free agents benefited financially from the special draft
but many players who elected to remain with their old clubs obtained substantial
salary increases. Ticket prices are expected to rise, and some organizations may bo
forced to cut back on farm systems and scouting. See id. Dec. 5, 1976, § 5, at 1, col. 3;
Gammons, Cashing in Their Tickets, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Nov. 22, 1976, at 82;
Keith, After the Free-For-All Was Over, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 13, 1970, at 29.
There is evidence that many more players will now refuse to sign contracts with their
existing teams, play out their options, and become free agents, hoping to obtain lucra-
tive multiyear contracts through the free-agent draft. Refer to note 97 supra and accom-
panying text. By the middle of spring training in 1977, about 100 major league players
were unsigned. Chicago Tribune, Maich 26, 1977, § 2, at 1, col. 1.
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eral directions. The Sherman Act is a prime example of a broadly framed
statute meant to oversee a multitude of business activities. Traditionally,
Congress has enacted broad statutes when faced with a novel or untouched
subject. These statutes then purposefully leave courts free to formulate
more definite standards within the general mandate set forth by the legis-
lature.1' 4 As a necessary corollary, judges play a more pronounced and
active role in the lawmaking process than when applying narrowly con-
strued statutes to given factual situations. And frequently judges will find
themselves confronted with a difficulty not contemplated by the applicable
statute; then again the courts cannot evade their lawmaking function.as
When Congress passed the antitrust laws in 1890, it was not responding
to the troubles of the infant sport of baseball. The legislation was directed
at the prevalent monopolistic practices of the time and gave the courts a
framework and a set of standards for meeting the problem. A federal
court succinctly characterized the judicial role mandated by the Act: "[W]e
have here a legislative warrant, because Congress has incorporated into
the Anti-Trust Acts the changing standards of the common law and by so
doing has delegated to the courts the duty of fixing the standard for each
case."
106
104. Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking-Judges Who Can't and Legislators Who
Won't, 63 CoLTJM. L. REv. 787, 792 (1963); see Cohen, Judicial "Legisputation" and
the Dimensions of Legislative Meaning, 36 IND. L.J. 414, 415-16 (1961).
105. Professor Liewellyn had the following to say on this subject:
[Als a statute gains in age-its language is called upon to deal with circum-
stances utterly uncontemplated at the time of its passage. Here the quest is not
properly for the sense originally intended by the statute for the sense sought
originally to be put into it, but rather for the sense which can be quarried out
of it in the light of the new situation.
Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About
How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 VAD. L. REv. 395, 400 (1950). See also Bishin,
The Law Finders: An Essay in Statutory Interpretation, 38 So. CA. L. REv. 1, 2
(1965); Curtis, A Better Theory of Legal Interpretation, 3 VAID. L. REV. 407, 415
(1950); Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLM. t. L. REV.
527, 528-29 (1947).
106. United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
The antitrust law abounds with court-created rules of construction and exemptions from
the application of the Sherman Act, necessitated by the broad, far-reaching nature
of the statute. For example, the "rule of reason" was created to give the courts some
guidelines in determining what restraints of trade are reasonable and therefore not
illegal. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59-60 (1911). However, the
courts determined that some types of restraints were so patently inconsistent with a
free market system that Congress would have accepted no justification for them. Thus.
the "per se" rule of illegality developed. See, e.g., United States v. Topeo Assocs., 405
U.S. 596, 606-12 (1972).
In Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), the Supreme Court was called upon
to decide if the Sherman Act was intended to apply to anticompetitive actions of a
state. Id. at 344. The so-called state action exemption that resulted has created a
great deal of confusion in the lower federal courts and a large amount of discord among
commentators. Compare Slater, Antitrust and Governmcnt Action: A Formula for Nar-
rowing Parker v. Brown, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 71 (1974), with Handler, The Current
Attack on the Parker v. Brown State Action Doctrine, 76 CoLtm. L. RBv. 1 (1976).




Thus, the Supreme Court in Federal Baseball was fulfilling its proper
function, even though one might question the merit of the decision. It is
a small step to assert that the Court should be able to review and revise
its previous decisions when dealing with the broad, ongoing directives of
Congress incorporated in laws such as the Sherman Act. A statute so broad
in scope and effect will necessarily not be uniformly applied to varying
activities in different times. If courts are to respond to the changes occur-
ring in different facets of our society and are to ensure that the development
of the law keeps pace with these changes, they should review and reevalu-
ate prior statutory interpretations in light of contemporary needs. Judicial
deference to legislative silence and the strict application of stare decisis
to statutory precedent prohibits the courts from participating, particularly
when dealing with broad directive legislation, in the continued formulation
and reevaluation of large areas of the law. While courts are initially free
to close the gray areas or gaps in the law,107 they are precluded from
reviewing and improving the gray areas in light of current considerations
once the initial decision is made.
IX. Tim PENMBRA AND FoRmAIisM
H.L.A. Hart has stated that legal rules emit a "core of settled meaning"
and "a penumbra of debatable cases."'08 The core consists of the standard
instances of application of the rule. For example, there can be little doubt
that the transportation of goods by a railroad from one state to another
comes within the interstate commerce standard of the Sherman Act. But
other factual situations are not axiomatic in their application to the stan-
dard. Certainly the interstate commercial nature of organized baseball
that was the subject of the Federal Baseball decision was questionable,
at least in the 1920s. These cases, according to Hart's positivist view, make
up the penumbra in which the legal rule is "neither obviously applicable
or obviously ruled out." 09 These situations typically include features in
common with the standard instances and either lack or have additional
features not contained in the standard case.
When judges decide cases in the penumbral situation they are by
necessity legislating. 1"0 By the same token, they are participating in the
development and refinement of the law. In Hart's terms, they are deter-
mining what the law ought to be."' Hart characterizes any conception of
107. B. CArmozo, THE NATURIE OF THE JUDICIAL PnocEss (1921).
108. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HAnv. L, REV.
593, 607 (1958).
109. Id.
110. Austin stated: "I cannot understand how any person who has considered
the subject can suppose that society could possibly have gone on if judges had not
legislated .... . J. AusrNm, LEcTURES ON JUrIUSPRUDENCE (Lecture V), at 1224 (rev.
4th ed. R. Campbell 1873).
111. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HAnv. L. REv.
593, 608 (1958).
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the judicial process that ignores the problems presented by the penumbra
as "formalism" or "literalism.""2
Austin was an outspoken critic of judicial formalism. He had little
patience with judges who relied blindly on the past instead of responding
to the developing needs of society.113 He believed that:
[I]t is much to be regretted that Judges of capacity, experience
and weight, have not seized every opportunity of introducing a
new rule (a rule beneficial for the future) . .. [T]he Judges of
the Common Law Courts would not do what they ought to
have done, namely to model their rules of law and of procedure
to the growing exigencies of society, instead of stupidly and
sulkily adhering to the old and barbarous usages. 1 4
In his view, Blackstone engaged in "childish fiction" when he posited that
judges only find and never make law." 5
Strict adherence to statutory interpretations can thus be characterized
as formalistic. Since the transformations that society undergoes can effect
the application of a set of facts to a particular statute, the courts should
be free to review and reevaluate the penumbral issues. But if the courts
defer to the legislature, they cannot respond to the penumbral issues of
statutory interpretation. The strict application of stare decisis mandates
that penumbral issues be solely within the legislative province when the
judiciary has once spoken. Thus, the judicial function, as seen by Hart and
Austin, is restricted." 6
The legal history of organized baseball illustrates a more extreme
result of the uniform use of statutory precedent because, although the case
presented by organized baseball and the antitrust laws may have been
within the penumbra when decided, the same situation is almost assuredly
within the "core of settled meaning" now. Organized baseball is engaged
in interstate commerce by all standards adhered to by present-day courts
and by the general understanding of the meaning of the term "interstate
commerce." The stand taken by the Supreme Court in Flood exemplifies
that the strict application of precedent to prior statutory interpretations
may not only preclude courts from deciding penumbral issues in accord
with contemporary social beliefs and goals but may actually prevent
decision making in the core. This, taken together with the very real possi-
bility of legislative inaction, means that statutes are not applied to the
112 Id. For a criticism of Hart's use of core and penumbra, see Fuller, Positicism
and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HAnv. L. REv. 630, 661-69 (1958).
113. See J. AusnN, LEcrumRs oN JuRm'CnuDmEc (Lecture XX.WIII), at 668
(rev. 4th ed. R. Campbell 1873).
114. Id.
115. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HA1'. L. Icv.
593, 610 (1958).
116. For a comparison of the legal theories of Hart and Austin, see Note, Hart,
Austin, and the Concept of a Legal System: The Primacy of Sanctions, 84 YA.E L.J.




"standard instances" but rather are relegated to the decision-making and
societal constraints of a different time.
X. CONCLUSION
The demonstrable changes in the character and position of organized
baseball since 1922 strongly suggest that the judiciary adopt a philosophy
that takes cognizance of the effects that change can have on the propriety
of prior statutory interpretations. A strict application of stare decisis or
rigid adherence to the belief that congressional silence evinces legislative
approval of the initial judicial statutory construction delegates decision
making to the past and disregards changes in social, political, and economic
values.'17 Predictability, stability, and continuity in the law overshadow
any existent need for flexibility or progression.1
Courts are obliged to reach the merits of any dispute when feasible
to fulfill their role as arbitrators of disputes and to ensure the progression
of the law. Courts, by reaching the merits, may affirm earlier decisions or
interpretations as well as reverse them. But, by failing to view the merits,
whether because of scrupulous adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis
or submission to the edict of legislative silence, courts affirm existing inter-
pretations without regard for their worth. When broad, policy-directing
statutes like the Sherman Act are involved, judicial inaction is even more
nonsensical. The failure of the courts to make decisions based on the
merits of the dispute means that many litigants will turn to nonjudicial
resolutions, such as collective bargaining.119 Respect for the judicial process
cannot be upgraded under these circumstances.
117. Note, Baseball's Antitrust Exemption: The Limits of Stare Decisis, 12 B.C.
INn. & COM. L. Rxv. 737, 745 (1971); Note, Baseball's Antitrust Exemption and thw
Reserve System: Reappraisal of an Anachronism, 12 WM. & MMIY L. Rv. 859 (1971).
118. It is interesting to note that under the recent settlement between the club
owners and the Major League Baseball Players Association, Curt Flood would have
obtained all of the relief he desired when he filed suit. He could have played out his
option, become a free agent, and participated in the special free-agent draft. Further,
because of his seniority he would have been able to reject any attempt by his parent
club to trade him to a team for which he did not want to perform. Refer to note 97
supra. For Flood's personal account of his struggle against the reserve clause, see C.
FLOOD, Txm WAY IT IS (1971).
119. Of course professional football and professional basketball have been the
subject of collective bargaining as well. But in both instances the reserve systems had
been watered down by court decisions holding the sports subject to the Sherman
Act. Refer to notes 46 and 51 supra. See generally Jacobs & Winter, Antitrust Principles
and Collective Bargaining by Athletes: Of Superstars in Peonage, 81 YALE L.J. 1
(1971).
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